Chapter THREE

After successfully completing his urgent mission, Maj. Gen. John Reynolds¹ rode back onto Seminary Ridge shortly before 10 o’clock the morning of July 1st 1863. A half-hour earlier, he’d ridden out of Gettysburg, heading south down the Emmitsburg Road where he’d intercepted a battery of Union artillery and two brigades of infantry² trudging toward its outskirts. He informed their commanders that these units were desperately needed to support Union cavalry engaged in a fire-fight a mile out of town. Directing that they head toward the smoke of battle rising above a ridge northwest of them, he’d sent this cavalcade hustling off across fields left of the road before galloping back through town with his small party of aides in tow.

During a reconnaissance he’d conducted with Brig. Gen. John Buford³ earlier that morning, Reynolds had learned that a strong Confederate force was marching east on the Chambersburg Pike heading for the small hamlet. Buford told Reynolds that his videttes had engaged Rebel pickets shortly after sunup over three miles west of the ridge they were standing on. Armed with repeating carbines and fighting on foot, his cavalrymen had managed to mount a stubborn defense that had bedeviled the Rebel advance for nearly two hours.

Exercising his authority as commander of the Left Wing of the Army of the Potomac, Reynolds decided to make a determined stand against these lead elements of Lee’s army⁴ in a bid to give Meade⁵ time to consider his options and bring up the rest of his forces should he choose to do so. Exhorting Buford to hold fast until his return, he’d galloped off in search of reinforcements.

As Reynolds watched the relief column he’d commandeered arrive, Cpt. Hall, and shortly thereafter, Gen. Cutler, reported to him for orders. He told Hall to plant his artillery beside the Chambersburg Pike where it passed over West McPherson Ridge.⁶ Cutler was to post two regiments near the McPherson farm buildings in support of Hall’s left flank. The bulk of his command was to proceed to the open fields north of an abandoned railroad cut running parallel to the Pike, and form a battle-line fronting west.

Wanting to confirm that his orders were being carried out to his satisfaction, Reynolds rode out to West McPherson Ridge.

Though visibility was obscured by smoke from Hall’s guns, he soon spied Rebel infantry crossing Willoughby Run, a shallow creek running along the base of the ridge, and working their way up into Herbst’s Wood, a stand of timber located about three hundred yards due south of Hall’s position. Reynolds was appalled! Both Hall’s battery and Cutler’s entire brigade were in danger of being out flanked! Signaling for his aides to follow, Reynolds raced back to East McPherson Ridge hoping to find that the “Iron Brigade” had reached the field and was ready for the fight.

Considering the utter bedlam that had erupted together with the smoke from several volleys which blanketed the woods obscuring vision, it’s extremely doubtful anyone saw Reynolds when he was struck. In an effort to determine what was more likely to have occurred, I examined numerous contemporary accounts, official reports, and histories devoted to The Battle of Gettysburg. The findings I derived from this extensive analysis are contained in “Enduring Tales of Gettysburg: The Death of Reynolds,”⁸an article I wrote for Gettysburg Magazine. This study notes that the most reliable sources locate him riding somewhere between the lines when struck behind the ear. Taken together, these two facts present a strong argument for Reynolds having been killed by accidental “friendly fire” rather than enemy action!

Commencing with Waud, these early chroniclers adopted a narrative intended to keep this horrendous possibility from ever being addressed. They insisted that Reynolds had either been riding away from the enemy when struck, or that he was looking back over his shoulder toward the Seminary. Numerous authors seeking to invest this far more palatable narrative with additional authenticity, followed Waud’s lead by indicating a location for the phantom marksman. One preposterous account even claimed the distance of this deadly shot measured over 800 yards!

Though the argument of whether Reynolds was killed by “friendly” or “enemy” fire will probably never be resolved, it’s beyond refute that the loss of the commander of the Union army’s Left Wing at the very commencement of the battle he was directing was a tremendous setback for the Federal force. The blow this dealt the Union command structure clearly hampered Meade’s ability to develop a plan of battle, and might even have proven significant enough to grant Lee the victory. Fortunately, this was not the case. After three bloody days of fighting, Lee’s army was forced to withdraw, and The Army of Northern Virginia never managed to cross the Potomac again.